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The Family in EU Law After the SM Ruling: 






ABSTRACT: SM (Court of Justice, judgment of 26 March 2019, case C-129/18 [GC]) revolved around the 
possibility of embracing a child in guardianship under the Algerian kafala system within the EU law 
notion of “family member”. In the ruling, the Court opened the door to a “variable geometry” notion 
of family. To this extended notion of family, it tendered enhanced protection through resort to fun-
damental rights law. And relatedly it recognized only conditional deference to host Member States 
with regard to the treatment of relevant family members in the context of their immigration rules. 
Rather than offering a detailed analysis of the case, this Insight focuses on these three aspects of the 
judgment as the starting point for a reflection on the evolving treatment of the “family” in EU law.  
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I. Embracing the variable geometry family 
Variable geometry is not a metaphor that comes from family law, let alone EU family 
law. It rather belongs to the vocabulary of integration modes, and strategies. In the dis-
course of European integration, it is an old leit-motive, recently revived by attempts to 
circumvent the integration crisis.1 Nonetheless, a ruling of the Court of Justice rendered 
in March, in the SM case,2 inspires to apply the metaphor to the notion of the family in 
EU law.3 The SM case concerned two European citizens of French nationality residing in 
the United Kingdom, and seeking entry clearance for the Algerian child of whom they 
 
* Senior Lecturer, University of Sheffield, Visiting Research Fellow, Collegio Carlo Alberto, Torino, 
f.strumia@sheffield.ac.uk. 
1 See e.g. Commission, White Paper on the Future of Europe – Reflections and Scenarios for the 
EU27 by 2025, COM(2017)2025 final, available at ec.europa.eu. 
2 Court of Justice, judgment of 26 March 2019, case C-129/18, SM v. UK Entry Clearance Office, Visa 
Section [GC]. 
3 For a comprehensive study of this notion, see C. COSTELLO, The Human Rights of Migrants and Refu-
gees in European Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 103 et seq. 
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had become legal guardians under the Algerian kafala system. They relied on the rights 
of the child as the adopted family member of an EEA national. The questions referred to 
the Court of Justice by the UK Supreme Court, and the Court's ruling, focus on the clari-
fication of two notions deployed in the Citizenship Directive,4 “direct descendant” and 
“any other family member”.5 By offering further guidance as to the meaning of both 
terms, the ruling shed clarity on the EU law notion of family.  
With regard to the notion of “direct descendant”, the court found that, absent an 
express reference to the law of the Member States, an independent EU-wide interpreta-
tion was needed. And absent an express definition in the Citizenship Directive, that in-
terpretation needed to take into account not only the wording of the directive, but also 
the context in which the notion was used and the objective of the rules to which it per-
tained. Given that the Citizenship Directive pursues the objective of strengthening the 
primary and individual right of movement, its provisions had to be read broadly. A 
broad reading of the notion of “direct descendant” required it to embrace both biologi-
cal and legal parent-child relations. But not relations of mere legal guardianship, such 
as that entailed by the Algerian kafala.6  
With regard to the notion of “any other family member”, the Court of Justice empha-
sized that the objective of the provision where the notion sat was maintaining the unity of 
the family in the context of free movement in respect of a broader circle of family mem-
bers. These were family members not belonging to the “core” family drawn by the defini-
tion of Art. 2, but nonetheless retaining close and stable family ties to a Union citizen, on 
account of a range of possible factual circumstances such as economic dependency, being 
members of the Union citizen’s household, or serious health grounds.7 While that defini-
tion is not new,8 the context of application is. In previous case law, the court had focused 
on the relation of dependency of a family member on a Union citizen. In SM, in embracing 
within the extended family a child under legal guardianship according to the Algerian 
kafala, the court emphasized, beyond the legal bond, the Union citizen’s responsibility for 
the care, education and protection of a person being a member of the household.9 
Albeit relying here on a situation of legal guardianship, in opening up the category of 
“other family member” to a range of relations characterized by household membership 
and reciprocal responsibilities, the SM ruling potentially brings within the purview of EU 
 
4 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States. 
5 Directive 2004/38, Art. 2, para. 2, let. c), and Art. 3, para. 2, let. a), respectively. 
6 SM [GC], cit., paras. 50-54. 
7 Ibidem, para. 60. 
8 See Court of Justice, judgment of 5 September 2012, case C-83/11, Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v. Rahman [GC]. 
9 SM [GC], cit., para. 59. 
The Family in EU Law After the SM Ruling: Variable Geometry and Conditional Deference 391 
law a notion of family broader than in textual definitions and traditional conceptions. It 
embraces, albeit perhaps in an unexpected context, the modern family, the diversity of 
households, the multiplicity of ties and the flexibility of arrangements that it entails. This is 
an opportunity the court had missed in previous family rights cases.10 In catching it in SM, 
the court potentially recognizes the family, for EU law purposes, as a variable geometry 
structure, with an inner strictly bounded core, and an outer broader circle whose perime-
ter is more flexible and may shift depending on factual circumstances. 
II. Strengthened protection for the extended family 
Not only the court entrenches the notion of an extended family for EU law purposes, it 
also lends some strengthened protection to this extended family. 
Under the Citizenship Directive, Member States do not owe a duty of admission to ex-
tended family members. Core family members, such as direct descendants, have a right 
against host Member states. In respect of extended family members, Member States only 
have an obligation to facilitate entry. They have to confer “a certain advantage” to their 
application for entry, based in good part on an extensive examination of personal circum-
stances. A key point is that Member States retain, in the context of that examination, dis-
cretion in deciding on admission.11 This opens a gap between the treatment of core and 
extended family members for free movement purposes. Core family members sit within 
the sphere of right that surrounds Union citizens. Extended family members remain in the 
sphere of immigration law, where any rights are concessions in disguise.12 
SM bridges, in part, the gap. The main novelty in the ruling is that Member State 
discretion in deciding on the admission of an extended family member finds a clear lim-
it in fundamental rights protection duties.13 In implementing their duty to facilitate the 
entry of extended family members, host Member States are required to make a bal-
anced assessment of all relevant circumstances and to take into account all interests in 
play. These include, in particular, the interests of the family and the best interest of the 
child, as protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.14 
 
10 See e.g. Court of Justice, judgment of 6 July 2015, case C-218/14, Kuldip Singh et al. v. Minister for 
Justice and Equality [GC]. For an analysis, F. STRUMIA, Divorce Immediately, or Leave. Rights of Third Coun-
try Nationals and Family Protection in the Context of EU Citizens’ Free Movement: Kuldip Singh and Oth-
ers, in Common Market Law Review, 2016, p. 1373 et seq. 
11 See SM [GC], cit., paras 61-63. 
12 For a reflection on the spheres of rights and of immigration, see D. THYM, Citizens and Foreigners 
in EU Law. Migration Law and Its Cosmopolitan Outlook, in European Law Journal, 2016, p. 296 et seq. 
13 See S. PEERS, Guardianship, Free Movement and the Rights of the Child, in EU Law Analysis, 26 
March 2019, eulawanalysis.blogspot.com. 
14 SM [GC], cit., paras 64-68. Also see Charter of Fundamental Rights, Art. 7 and Art. 24, para. 2. 
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This resort to EU fundamental rights law to contain discretion tempers the harsh-
ness of the immigration law approach. It shifts the admission decision away from the 
concession end of the spectrum and back towards its rights’ end. 
III. Conditional deference to host Member States 
This says something, in turn, on an interesting, if understated, judicial trend, in respect 
of family rights in the context of free movement. On the one hand, in a rather long line 
of cases, the Court has recognized the duty of home Member States to admit the third 
country national family members of nationals returning from the exercise of free 
movement.15 In relevant cases, the duty is justified in light of not discouraging the exer-
cise of the right to move on the part of the Union citizens, and is grounded in Art. 21 
TFEU, read through an application by analogy of the Citizenship Directive.16 On the oth-
er hand, in interpreting the provisions of the Citizenship Directive regarding host Mem-
ber State obligations, the Court –despite its affirmation in the SM case that those obliga-
tions are to be read broadly-has increasingly demonstrated deference to host Member 
States.17 The ruling in SM sits, at first sight, within this trend. In classifying children un-
der legal guardianship according to the kafala system as extended family members, the 
Court recognizes the discretionary nature of the host Member State’s decision to admit 
them or not. It defers to host Member States and their judgment. On the other hand, in 
emphasizing the role of fundamental rights in limiting such discretion, it highlights that 
the deference recognized to host Member States is conditional on their commitment to 
protect individual, fundamental rights. In this sense, it stirs away slightly from its recent 
attitudes towards the intensity of host Member State obligations. It is a clever balance: 
it pays tribute to sovereign interests and sensitivities, while at the same time maintain-
ing a protective attitude towards individual rights. 
IV. Conclusion 
Ultimately, the judgment gives to the family as a social entity an important place in the 
EU architecture of rights. In doing this, it brings good news in two respects. First, it re-
lies, for these purposes, on a flexible, pragmatic idea of family that leaves potential 
room to several models of cohabitation and reciprocal responsibility, and to a variety of 
underlying bonds, from the biological, to the legal, to the factual and affective. Second, 
in protecting family rights from the strictures of immigration law, the judgment moves 
 
15 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 March 2014, case C-456/12, O. and B.; judgment of 5 June 2018, 
case C-673/16, Coman v. Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări[GC]; judgment of 12 July 2018, case C-
89/17, Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rozanne Banger. 
16 O. and B., cit., paras 49-50. 
17 See e.g. Singh et al. [GC], cit.; Court of Justice, judgment of 30 June 2015, case C-115/15, Secretary 
of State for the Home Department v. NA, paras 49-51. 
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with agility between state and individual interests. The ability of the court, and of EU 
free movement law more in general, to play along with sovereignty while not yielding 
ground on individual rights is a crucial skill, in times of integration crisis, resurgent na-
tionalism, and endangered internationalism. 
 
